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Chapter Five
Anatomy of Industry Resistance to Climate Change: A Familiar Litany
by Robert L. Glicksman

The industries that generate environmental risks in the United States have long
been hostile to regulatory programs that increase their costs of operation and
reduce their profits. While industry may have been unprepared for, and thus
poorly organized to resist, the first wave of federal environmental legislation
enacted during the “environmental decade” of the 1970s,1 it quickly marshaled
its forces. Regulated or potentially regulated entities, their trade associations,
and their lobbyists began a concerted effort to defeat, delay, and weaken
environmental regulation.
At the beginning of the environmental decade, politicians sought to
present themselves as more committed to environmental protection than their
opponents. In doing so, they tried to ride the crest of growing public support
for strong government steps to deal with the health and environmental risks
stemming from industrial activity and land development.2 In that atmosphere,
it was relatively easy for Congress to adopt significant new environmental
legislation, and the initial versions of the modern Clean Air and Water Acts
passed Congress with virtually no dissent.3
By the beginning of the 1980s, however, a significant shift had occurred
in the American political environment. That shift, and the neoliberal ideology
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that fueled and supported it, produced a federal government that was far more
receptive to industry’s efforts to stall, obstruct, and weaken environmental law.
The arguments industry advanced against environmental regulation, which to
that point had fallen largely on deaf ears in Washington, D.C., now found a
receptive audience among environmental policy makers. The pivotal turning
point was the election of Ronald Reagan as President in 1980, followed shortly
after that by Republican capture of the U.S. Senate. The free market ideology to
which the Reagan Administration was strongly committed became even more
deeply entrenched when Republicans captured control of both houses of
Congress in 1994 and of both the executive and legislative branches of the
federal government in 2000. The ascendance of this ideology allowed the
opponents of regulation to frame their arguments, which previously had
relatively little impact, in terms that struck a responsive chord with politicians
and provided the arguments with traction that previously did not exist.
This chapter describes the process by which regulatory opponents
successfully relied on free market ideology to couch their opposition to health,
safety, and environmental regulation in terms that would resonate with the
American public in ways it never had before. They portrayed regulation as the
product of overreaching, meddlesome, wrong‐headed, and power hungry
bureaucrats that would almost inevitably detract from rather than enhance
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social welfare. In doing so, regulatory opponents enabled politicians to justify
their efforts to derail and weaken protective regulation in terms consistent with
pursuit of the public interest, rather than as a quid pro quo for the support of
narrow, self‐interested elements of the regulatory community. The chapter also
analyzes how industry and its political supporters have relied on a familiar
litany of anti‐regulatory arguments generated by conservative ideologues to
throttle the efforts of those who support government initiatives to tackle
climate change.

I.

Laissez‐Faire Liberalism Redux

The market‐based ideology that increasingly shaped federal regulatory policy
beginning in 1981 has been described as “the contemporary reincarnation of the
nineteenth century ‘laissez‐faire’ liberalism that advanced the primacy of ‘the
market’ over ‘government regulation.’”4 The proponents of this ideology view
“state abstention from economic protection [as] the foundation of a good
society.”5 They contend that an efficient market represents the path to public
well‐being because undisturbed market competition produces incentives to
maximize both productivity and individual responsibility. They regard the
market as a reflection of neutral, value‐free laws and view government as the
problem, to which a commitment to the protection of private property rights,

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1544454

4
“privatization, decentralization, and deregulation are the answers.”6 This
“cultural exaltation of the market”7 conceives of government regulation as a
means of diverting resources from efficiency‐maximizing citizens to special
interests and bloated government bureaucracies, with the inevitable
consequence of shrinking the overall economic pie.8
Worse yet, according to the foes of regulation, government regulators
tend to be incompetent and regulatory programs often produce unintended
adverse consequences, harming the very interests they are designed to protect.
According to free market proponents of this ilk, progressive regulatory
programs (like environmental protection regimes) are often poorly designed,
creating government failures that are worse than the market failures they
purport to correct.9 Regulation often diverts resources away from productive
endeavors into compliance efforts whose costs exceed their benefits. Indeed,
compliance costs reduce profitability, resulting in reductions in wages, which
in turn make it harder for employees to afford a healthy lifestyle. Further,
regulation imposes costs on American businesses that make it less competitive
in international markets and create incentives for them to relocate overseas
where the absence of regulation yields lower operating costs.
As a fallback argument, when the opponents of regulation were unable
to completely derail regulation, they argued that regulation designed to redress
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market failures (such as the imposition of unwarranted externalities) should
nevertheless mimic the operation of a well‐functioning free market to the extent
possible. They urged regulators to rely heavily on the analytical technique of
cost‐benefit analysis to determine the appropriate level of regulation. Cost‐
benefit analysis would send in a regulatory context the same kinds of price
signals that the unimpeded free market would provide in the absence of
market failure in order to achieve efficient resource allocation. It would prevent
government from engaging in excessive and counterproductive amounts of
regulation.

II.

The Growing Ascendancy of Free Market Ideology

These ideas began to influence federal environmental policy even before the
election of President Reagan. The Republican Party’s platform in 1980
committed it to alleviating “the crushing burden of excessive regulation,”
singling out EPA’s “excessive” efforts to achieve zero risk. The platform also
promised a “war on overregulation.”10 Once Reagan took office, he declared
that government is the problem, not the solution to society’s ills.11 Reagan
Administration officials and the President himself, who voiced “a long‐
standing ideological commitment to shrinking the role of the federal
government,”12 railed against “big government,” bureaucratic red tape, and the
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social policies of “tax and spend liberals.” To the extent government had a role
to play in restricting the operation of the free market to achieve social policy
goals such as protection of health, safety, and the environment, state and local
governments were better situated to fulfill this role than the federal
government. By thus casting aspersions on the federal government’s efforts to
protect the public from industry, Reagan encouraged the belief that his
administration’s opposition to social regulation coincided with the interests of
the average American.
The public at large was not the only audience of the new, anti‐regulatory
rhetoric. The federal government’s increased hostility to social and economic
regulation developed at the same time that conservative thinkers such as
William Simon, Irving Kristol, and Richard Scaife attacked such regulation.
These thinkers preached to the business community the notion that “ideas were
important” and that they should promote those that were “sympathetic to the
interests of business.”13 They encouraged business to frame opposition to
regulation in terms of the detrimental impact it would have on those it was
supposed to protect − the general public − and to promote the idea that an
unimpeded free market was a superior means of protecting private property
and enriching the lives of ordinary Americans. By 1994, the essence of the anti‐
regulatory credo was captured in Phillip Howard’s 1994 book, The Death of
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Common Sense, which portrayed government regulators as incompetent
bunglers whose irrational decrees were suffocating America.14
Together, conservative academics, business interests, and their political
allies successfully painted a portrait of health, safety, and environmental
regulation as worse than the social ills it was designed to ameliorate (even
assuming that these ills were legitimate subjects of concern to begin with). As
one environmental scholar has put it, “the actions taken by the business
community effectively established the political and intellectual foundation for a
series of subsequent reform efforts that have challenged the basic tenets of the
environmental protection laws that Congress enacted in the 1970s.”15 More
specifically, the free market ideology that produced the anti‐regulatory
sentiments described above, and the federal government’s receptivity to that
ideology, resulted in a cosmic shift in the burden of proof. It was no longer
industry that had to justify being allowed to engage in activities that create
risks to the public health and safety and the environment. Instead, it was
government that had to justify intervening in the market by demonstrating
that, against all odds, regulation would enhance, not diminish social welfare.16
In this way, the federal policy making process became less responsive to those
who urged more effective protection for health, safety, and the environment.
By framing opposition to regulation in the rhetoric of free market liberalism,
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conservative ideologues succeeded in creating an environment in which
government policy makers could wrap their own unwillingness to support
regulation in the American flag, rather than appearing to be the lapdogs of
narrowly self‐interested big business.

III.

The Anti‐Regulatory Litany

The entrenchment of free market ideology in the federal environmental policy
making process made policy makers more receptive to a litany of claims by
regulated or potentially regulated entities who sought to prevent or weaken
regulation. These anti‐regulatory arguments surfaced again and again. Facing
regulatory initiatives in Congress or federal agencies that they wished to avoid,
industry and its political allies typically began by asserting that there was no
problem that warranted regulation or that, even if there was such a problem,
they were not responsible for creating it. If those arguments proved insufficient
to thwart regulation, industry tended to resort to the claim that no
technologically practical solution existed to resolve the problem at issue. If that
argument failed, industry usually argued that any attempt to solve the problem
through regulation would have unacceptable adverse economic consequences
(either for the regulated industry itself or for the nation as a whole), and that,
even if regulation was affordable, the costs of regulation would outweigh
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anticipated regulatory benefits. The final anti‐regulatory salvo sometimes took
the form of an effort to portray regulation as an unwarranted intrusion on
personal liberty and individual rights (including private property rights).
Before 1980, these themes had largely fallen on deaf ears. The rise of free
market liberalism afforded them a legitimacy they previously lacked, and
provided cover for politicians sympathetic to the opponents of regulation.
Particular elements of the litany have been more or less successful in defeating
regulation in different circumstances. The strategy of relying on it has remained
remarkably stable, however, and it typically delays the onset of regulation even
when it does not completely prevent its adoption.
The remainder of this chapter provides examples of industry’s
invocation of these themes to throttle federal health, safety, or environmental
regulation. It then describes how anti‐regulatory crusaders have used the same
arguments to convince policy makers and the public that climate change
regulation is premature, inadvisable, and not worth the heavy costs it is bound
to impose on the American economy.

IV.

The Litany in Action

A. “Prove It!”
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The most obvious strategy for defeating regulation is to deny the existence of a
problem worthy of government attention. One example of this strategy relates
to the health risks posed by environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), or second‐
hand smoke. When EPA issued a report in the 1990s in which it concluded that
ETS causes lung cancer in humans, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) considered restricting exposure to ETS in the
workplace. Internal tobacco industry memoranda describe the industry’s
efforts to deny that ETS creates health risks by, among other things, attacking
the scientific validity of EPA’s report. As part of its “decade‐long efforts to cast
doubt upon EPA’s risk assessment initiative,”17 the industry sought out
scientists who would “belittle the risks posed by ETS.”18 These scientists sent
letters to prominent medical journals contesting any findings that ETS posed
cancer risk. They published their own studies refuting the conclusions in EPA’s
report. The industry engaged in a major advertising campaign ridiculing EPA’s
position and it even sued EPA (unsuccessfully) to invalidate EPA’s ETS report
and force EPA to disavow it.19
Another prominent example of industry’s invocation of the denial
strategy arose in connection with the debate during the 1980s over how to
address the phenomenon of acid rain. Two prominent supporters of free
market environmentalism claimed that “there is little evidence that acid rain is
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causing widespread problems.”20 Politicians supportive of the coal mining
industry questioned both the need for and the legitimacy of a regulatory
program to control sulfur dioxide, which is emitted by facilities that burn coal.
Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia expressed concern that “reality may very
well diverge from [the] theory” advanced in support of the 1990 Clean Air
Act’s “bold new regulatory approach” for abating acid rain. Dissenting from a
Senate Report that accompanied a bill proposing federal controls for acid rain
precursors, Senator Steve Symms asserted that Congress should have deferred
any decision to regulate in light of the speculative nature of the scientific
evidence concerning the existence, causes, and effects of acid rain.21 The Reagan
Administration echoed these themes, refusing to back measures to combat acid
rain in light of continuing questions about the extent of the problem.22 When
EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus proposed a modest regulatory
program, OMB Director David Stockman ridiculed it, and action was deferred
until the first Bush Administration.23 The opponents of regulation cited claims
by some scientists that acid rain would be beneficial, for example, by increasing
soybean productivity and pine needle growth.24

B. “It’s Not My Fault”
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When the evidence of an environmental problem becomes sufficiently
overwhelming that credible denials are no longer possible, it is necessary for
those wishing to avoid regulation to resort to fallback arguments. Opponents of
regulation frequently claim that even if a problem exists, it is not being caused
by the anticipated targets of regulation. An oft‐ridiculed example in the
political arena was President Reagan’s suggestion that trees are responsible for
more air pollution (nitrogen oxide in particular) than American industry.25
A more serious example is the notoriously persistent efforts that the
tobacco industry made to deny a causal connection between inhalation of
tobacco smoke and lung cancer, heart disease, and other adverse health
consequences. The most notorious example of the tobacco industry’s campaign
of denial may be the congressional testimony of executives from the largest
tobacco companies denying any knowledge of the addictive nature of their
products. But the industry’s entire anti‐regulatory campaign was based largely
on a denial of proof of a causal link between tobacco use and adverse health
effects. The campaign entailed a multi‐faceted and “concerted public relations
effort to create and perpetuate controversy over the question whether cigarettes
are harmful to health,” including “careful orchestration and eventual
suppression of internal research into the health issues raised by cigarettes.”
These efforts occurred “despite the industry’s extensive knowledge of the
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actual health risks of smoking. Tobacco manufacturers have long known that
cigarettes cause cancer, emphysema, and lung disease.”26 The tobacco
industry’s strategy was to “fram[e] consensus as controversy.”27 It sought to
generate and perpetuate confusion and uncertainty about any possible link
between smoking and illness by “smearing and belittling” scientific studies
purporting to establish a causal link between cigarettes and disease,
overwhelming those studies with mass publication of studies with opposing
results, and challenging the validity of studies finding such a link in public
debate.28 According to one federal district court, the tobacco industry knew for
decades that smoking causes lung cancer and other diseases but, “[d]espite that
knowledge, they have consistently, repeatedly, and with enormous skill and
sophistication, denied these facts to the public, to the Government, and to the
public health community.”29 Industry’s objectives included avoiding
regulation, liability in tort actions brought by smokers and their families, and
threats to the industry’s economic viability.
The tobacco industry’s long fight to create and sustain doubt about the
health risks posed by its products is the most egregious example of an
industry’s efforts to avoid costly regulation and liability by denying
responsibility for a health, safety, or environmental problem. But other
examples abound. Businesses that manufacture and use chemicals suspected of
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creating a risk that exposed individuals will contract cancer or other serious
diseases have often denied that their products are dangerous or that exposure
to them could possibly be responsible for adverse health effects. The Lead
Industries Association attacked EPA’s efforts to limit concentrations of lead in
the ambient air by denying that lead concentrations in human blood at the
levels deemed unacceptable by EPA were dangerous and that the use of lead as
an automotive fuel additive was responsible for unhealthy blood lead levels.30
In the late 1970s, industry sought to defeat OSHA’s efforts to adopt generic
regulations limiting workplace exposures to carcinogenic substances by, among
other things, contesting the validity of animal bioassay data as predictors of
human cancer risk. They also pointed to lifestyle choices such as diet and
alcohol consumption, rather than chemical exposure, as primarily responsible
for any rise in cancer incidence. In addition, they postulated the existence of
safe threshold levels of exposure below which disease would not develop.31 The
Reagan Administration relied on these and related contentions to justify its
conclusion that the presence of uncertainty over the effects of exposure to
formaldehyde justified refusing to regulate it as an environmental carcinogen.32

C. “I Can’t Help It!”
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The next logical step in the parade of arguments that industry and its political
allies often make to forestall regulation is that there is no technologically
feasible way to avoid a health, safety, or environmental problem that has been
identified and linked to a particular industry or set of activities. The American
automobile industry has long been the poster child for this strategy. When
Congress authorized EPA in the Clean Air Act of 1970 to adopt restrictions on
tailpipe emissions of air pollutants such as carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons,
and oxides of nitrogen, industry’s response was to claim that compliance by the
applicable regulatory deadlines would be impossible.33 When industry sought
an extension of the deadlines for compliance, EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus
refused to provide one, concluding that industry had failed to prove that
effective control technology would not be available in time to meet the
deadlines. A court overturned that decision at industry’s behest on the ground
that EPA’s denial was arbitrary because the risks of an erroneous denial
exceeded the risks of an erroneous grant.34 Industry used the same
technological impossibility argument to convince Congress to grant further
extensions when it amended the Clean Air Act in 1977. These delays made it
impossible for many areas of the country, particularly urban areas with
extensive automobile traffic, to achieve timely compliance with EPA’s health‐
based ambient air quality standards.35
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The remarkable part of this story is that, at least according to the Justice
Department in an antitrust suit it filed in 1969, the three major American
automakers had conspired among themselves “not to compete in research,
development, manufacture, and installation of [automotive pollution] control
devices, and did all in their power to delay such [activities].” The Department
concluded that the industry “ignored promising inventions, refused to
purchase pollution‐control technologies developed by others, delayed
installing smog controls already available and known to them, and at times
disciplined members of the cartel whose adherence to the collective
suppression effort might temporarily waiver.”36 Shortly before Congress passed
the Clean Air Act of 1970, the industry signed a consent decree with the Justice
Department that “at least implied that the big three manufacturers had in fact
illegally worked together to thwart air pollution control.”37

D. “It’s Not Worth It!”
Sometimes, the targets of regulation cannot advance a plausible argument that
regulation is unwarranted or premature because there is no problem worthy of
regulation, that any problem is someone else’s fault, or that proposed solutions
are beyond society’s current technological capacity. Regulatory opponents
rarely give up and meekly accept regulation simply because these arguments
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are unavailing. Instead, they are likely to move on to the next component of the
litany by contending that regulation is too expensive or that the costs of
regulation exceed the anticipated regulatory benefits, making regulation
counterproductive.38 Sometimes, industry, conservative regulatory policy
analysts, or politicians antithetical to regulation make these arguments in the
aggregate, claiming that the total cost of health, safety, or environmental
regulation is exorbitantly high,39 or that the costs of all regulation of a particular
kind (such as regulation of activities that contribute to air pollution) greatly
exceed the resulting regulatory benefits.40 These kinds of arguments are more
commonly made, and often with greater impact on regulatory policymakers, in
the context of efforts to prevent, delay, or weaken particular instances of health,
safety, or environmental regulation.
Industry and its political allies routinely claim that regulation will result
in dramatic adverse economic consequences. The auto industry, in addition to
relying on the alleged unavailability of control technology to delay tailpipe
emission standards, asserted that the emission controls authorized by the Clean
Air Act would result in “business catastrophe.”41 Industry also asserted that the
stratospheric ozone depletion and acid rain control provisions of the 1990
Clean Air Act amendments would cause the prices for a variety of consumer
goods made with chlorofluorocarbons and the cost of electricity to increase
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precipitously. In retrospect, these kinds of cost estimates often turn out to have
been wildly inflated. One study of the economic impact of a dozen major
environmental regulatory programs found that in each case, both industry and
the federal government overestimated compliance costs. In all but one of those
instances, pre‐regulatory estimates exceeded the actual costs of compliance by
more than 100 percent.42 The oil industry, for example, claimed that the cost of
phasing out lead as a motor vehicle fuel additive would cost billions of dollars
more than it did. The coal and electric utility industries greatly overstated the
costs of controlling acid rain; while the cost of purchasing an SO2 allowance
was initially estimated at $750 per ton, it fell below $100 within six years of
Congress’s adoption of the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments.43
Another version of this strategy for blocking regulation is to assert that,
even if regulation will enhance public health or safety, the costs of regulation
will exceed the benefits achieved. A recent example relates to EPA’s efforts to
control exposure to ground‐level ozone, which can cause respiratory tract
problems, premature aging of lung tissue, and reduced resistance to infection.
When EPA announced in 2007 that it was considering lowering maximum
permissible ozone concentrations in the ambient air, Senator James Inhofe of
Oklahoma, a frequent and vocal opponent of federal air pollution regulations
who serves on the Senate Environment Committee, opposed the proposal on
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the ground that it would “impose significant costs on counties and states across
the country with too little environmental benefit.”44
Clearly, those opposed to regulation believe they are more likely to
strike a responsive chord with the public if they assert that environmental
regulation will create hardships for the American public due to its high cost
than if they acknowledge opposition to environmental regulation in general or
complain about the impact of costly regulation on corporate profits,
shareholder dividends, and executive compensation. Just as clearly, even
though the doomsday scenarios painted by regulatory skeptics should not be
taken at face value, they present pro‐free market regulators inclined to weaken
regulation with a plausible reason for doing so.

E. “That’s Not Fair!”
One final strategy for avoiding regulation is to assert that it will interfere with
or preclude desirable lifestyle choices for average Americans, interfere with
cherished American freedoms, or impair individual rights such as private
property rights. Conservative commentators such as Irving Kristol have
claimed that interference with the free market through economic and social
regulation will ultimately cause “the destruction of freedom”45
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One good example of this phenomenon involves the federal
government’s efforts to reduce air pollution from automobiles and encourage
the production and use of energy efficient vehicles. The auto and highway
construction industries have engaged in public relations campaigns designed to
convince consumers that pollution controls and fuel efficiency standards will
not only cause sharp price increases for new cars, but also reduce consumer
choice by eliminating or restricting access to the larger vehicles that some
drivers prefer.46 The industries and their lobbyists also have argued that the
smaller vehicles that fuel economy standards will force consumers to use are
less safe than larger vehicles. Public opposition to more direct restrictions on
personal use of automobiles, fueled by the opponents of regulation within
industry and government, have contributed to the federal government’s
inability to restrict commuting by automobile, compel carpooling, and require
rigorous vehicle emissions testing.47
The federal environmental regulatory programs that tend to be at the
greatest risk tend to be those that are most easily portrayed as invasive of
private property rights. Legislative hearings on the controversial dredge and
fill permit program under the Clean Water Act have featured small property
owners (called at the behest of congressional opponents of the program) who
testified that regulation crushed their dreams of owning their own homes or
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profitably operating the farm that the family has owned for generations.
Similarly, the public face of the real estate industry’s virulent opposition to the
Endangered Species Act’s prohibition on the modification of the habitat of
listed species is not the corporate developer whose plans to build and sell huge
and expensive vacation homes or the timber companies whose logging efforts
were upset by regulatory restrictions. Instead, the anti‐regulatory campaigns
orchestrated by lobbies for these industries feature individual landowners
whose small tracts are subject to regulatory restrictions. Regulatory opponents
assert that the government is engaged in unfair treatment of private property
owners in these instances and, in some cases, that regulation amounts to an
unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation.
Politicians who would never express outright opposition to the protection of
clean water supplies or the value of protecting endangered species may feel
comfortable opposing regulation if they are able to couch their opposition as a
crusade to protect unfair government infringement on sacrosanct private
property rights.

V.

Using the Litany to Thwart Efforts to Address Climate Change

The opponents of health, safety, and environmental regulation have not always
succeeded in derailing it by making the arguments described above.
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Frequently, however, they have provided handy justifications for policymakers
antagonistic to regulation in their efforts to block or water down regulatory
initiatives. Industry and its political allies have resorted to the same strategy to
fight the adoption of federal climate change policy initiatives. Segments of
industry that would likely be primary targets of climate change regulation,
such as the energy industry, have advanced the familiar, sequential, anti‐
regulatory litany. So have officials in both the executive and legislative
branches of the federal government who oppose doing anything other than
more study to address the risks of climate change. These policymakers have
responded to the advice provided in a remarkable document prepared by a
Republican Party political consultant, Frank Luntz, which provides a road map
for justifying opposition to climate change legislation. The Luntz memorandum
is a striking example of an effort to convince politicians to frame anti‐
regulatory policy positions in the garb of the free market liberalism that has
historically served the opponents of regulation so well.

VI.

Industry Resorts to the Litany to Block Climate Change Regulation

Not surprisingly, industry’s first line of defense against the adoption of climate
change regulation has been to deny the existence of the problem. Industry’s
fallback argument has been that, even if the problem exists, humans in general
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and their own activities in particular are not responsible for causing it. One
journalist has described a “well‐coordinated, well‐funded campaign” begun in
the late 1980s and patterned after the tobacco industry’s denial that cigarettes
are dangerous. The campaign involved efforts
by contrarian scientists, free‐market think tanks and industry [to
create] a paralyzing fog of doubt around climate change. Through
advertisements, op‐eds, lobbying and media attention,
greenhouse doubters . . . argued first that the world is not
warming; measurements indicating otherwise are flawed, they
said. Then they claimed that any warming is natural, not caused
by human activities. Now they contend that the looming
warming will be miniscule and harmless.48
In portraying warming as a fleeting natural phenomenon rather than one
caused by human activity, these groups claimed that increased energy output
from the sun or increased sunspot activity may be the culprit, and that “sound
science” has not yet identified man‐made greenhouse gas emissions as the
definitive cause, or even a significant contributing factor.
The public pronouncements of industries most likely to be targeted by
climate change regulation have exemplified this strategy. The Business
Roundtable is a group made up of some of the nation’s top business leaders
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(including the energy and auto industries). It represents about one‐third of the
total value of U.S. stock markets. The Roundtable has recommended
“prudence” before taking any steps to address climate change because “the
science continues to evolve.”49 In particular, it has opposed the adoption of any
mandatory reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.
As the existence of climate change and the human contribution to it have
become harder and harder to deny, industry has shifted its focus to other
elements of the well‐worn anti‐regulatory litany. Industry has fueled fears that
the cost of addressing climate change will be exorbitant and unacceptable. The
U.S. Chamber of Commerce has warned that federal climate change legislation
will cause a huge increase in energy prices and force U.S. businesses to relocate
to countries without climate change regulation. Indeed, federal legislators have
warned that “unilateral” adoption of greenhouse gas controls by the United
States would induce nations such as China and India to resist controls in order
to enhance their own position in world markets.50 Spokespersons for the coal
industry have criticized support for climate change legislation among some
corporate leaders by charging that they “have demonstrated a willingness to
devastate the overall American economy for their own short‐term gains.”51
Industry also has argued that climate change regulation would be
unduly intrusive and require unnecessary sacrifices that likely would do little if
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anything to abate climate change. Representatives of the auto industry have
used this tactic in expressing opposition to the adoption by California and
other states of standards to control greenhouse gas emissions from motor
vehicles. They have claimed that the controls would be “counterproductive” in
that they would increase the price of cars, narrow the choice of vehicles
available to consumers, sacrifice auto safety, and cause job losses. In addition,
they have claimed that there is no proof that California’s approach to
controlling greenhouse gas emissions would actually help slow global
warming.52 Auto industry spokespersons predicted that the Big Three U.S. car
manufacturers would have to quit the passenger car and small truck markets
entirely if states were allowed to adopt their own, disparate mandatory caps on
greenhouse gas emissions.53

VII.

The Luntz Memorandum

The arguments against taking action to tackle climate change might not have
taken root but for the willingness of politicians friendly to industry to endorse
the arguments in the policy making arena. The blueprint for politicians
opposed to climate change regulation was laid out bluntly in a memorandum
written by Republican Party consultant Frank Luntz early in the first term of
President George W. Bush and subsequently leaked to the press. The
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memorandum, titled “The Environment: A Cleaner, Safer, Healthier America,”
was written to provide advice to Republican candidates to help them counter
claims by Democrats that climate change regulation was imperative.54 It began
with general advice before providing specific guidance on how Republican
candidates should justify their opposition to federal programs to address
climate change.
Notably, the strategy was cast in explicitly ideological terms. In
particular, it relied heavily on the anti‐government, pro‐market rhetoric that
had long served the opponents of regulation so well and that allowed them to
pitch positions that otherwise would likely have been unpalatable to the public.
The memorandum thus employed framing to make reliance on the litany of
industry objections politically feasible.
The Luntz memo urged candidates to emphasize the same themes that
had characterized opposition to environmental regulation since 1980 and that
reflected a commitment to free market ideology. It urged candidates to
“[p]rovide specific examples of federal bureaucrats failing to meet their
responsibilities to protect the environment”; stress the need for freedom,
accountability and responsibility; “specify and quantify the number of jobs lost
because of needless, redundant regulation”; demand that “Washington . . .
disclose the expected cost of current and all new environmental regulation”; and
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urge an emphasis on “common sense” and the use of “realistic assumptions.”55
Candidates were urged to “explain how it is possible to pursue a common sense
or sensible environmental policy” that preserves past gains “without going to
extremes.” “Give citizens the idea that progress is being frustrated by over‐reaching
government.”56 The suggested message was clear: government is the problem,
not the solution; out‐of‐control bureaucrats are irrational zealots who have a
hidden and self‐serving agenda that does not correspond to the interests of the
general public; and the direct and indirect costs of environmental regulation
are unacceptably high.
The memo encouraged Republican candidates to think of environmental
issues as “compelling stories,” and stated that what matters most is “how you
frame your argument, and the order in which you present your facts.” The
objective of this story‐telling exercise is to convince the public that its salvation
lies in acceptance of “the conservative, free market approach to the
environment.”57 The memo advised candidates to stress the desirability of a
limited role for the federal government in protecting the environment.
Although “the public demands at least some federal guidelines, . . . people
don’t want an intrusive federal bureaucracy dictating local enforcement.”58
The Luntz memorandum included a separate section entitled, “Winning
the Global Warming Debate − An Overview.” The implication is obvious − the
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ultimate objective is not to actually prevent the adverse effects of climate
change but to “win the debate” by convincing the public that the optimal
federal climate change policy is to do nothing. The arguments suggested in the
memo were designed to respond to Democratic criticism of President Bush’s
renunciation of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change in 2001. It listed several
essential points that should provide the foundation for Republicans’ positions
on climate change.
The first argument, not surprisingly, was to declare that the existence of
global climate change remains unproven:
The scientific debate remains open. Voters believe that there is no
consensus about global warming within the scientific community.
Should the public come to believe that the scientific issues are
settled, their views about global warming will change
accordingly. Therefore, you need to continue to make the lack of
scientific certainty a primary issue in the debate . . . .59
Similarly, the Luntz memo urged its audience to “[e]mphasize the importance
of ‘acting only with all the facts in hand,’ and ‘making the right decision, not the quick
decision.’” The major federal environmental laws rest on the premise that
environmental policy makers should err on the side of caution by acting to
prevent environmental risk even in the face of scientific uncertainty. Despite
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that precautionary thrust, the memo urged Republicans to rely on a version of
the “dead bodies” standard − regulation is inappropriate until a pile of dead
bodies definitively proves that there is a problem − that had been soundly
rejected by both Congress and the courts beginning in the 1970s. To make the
argument more palatable, the memo stressed that “[t]he most important point in
any discussion of global warming is your commitment to sound science” and common
sense. It issued an ominous warning, however, that “[t]he scientific debate is
closing [against us] but not yet closed. There is still a window of opportunity to
challenge the science.”60 Thus, the memorandum provided a sound science
framing device to justify acceptance of the first part of the litany, the denial of a
problem.
The Luntz memo recommended raising the specter of economic ruin by
portraying climate change regulation as another example of big government
taxing the people to death: “Remember, Americans already think they are an
overtaxed people. Treaties such as Kyoto would have been just another tax on
an already overburdened population.”61 Nor did the memo neglect the
argument that regulation precludes important choices to which U.S. citizens are
entitled. It urged its readers to “[t]alk about the real world day‐to‐day effects
that proposed environmental remedies would have on their everyday lives,”62
and to scare people by predicting that “major lifestyle changes” would result
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from regulation.63 If climate change, improbably, turns out to be for real, the
market would provide the optimal response. Regulation was unnecessary,
costly, and inevitably would not work.
The memo also suggested that politicians opposed to regulation play the
“fairness” card by arguing that the United States should not take any steps to
address climate change until nations such as Mexico, China, and India commit
to do so. Indeed, the memo characterized the “international fairness issue” as
“the emotional home run.” Any hint that the U.S. climate change policy should
continue the tradition of U.S. leadership on environmental issues was entirely
absent. Another fairness argument turned on the disproportionate impacts that
climate change regulation would have on the disadvantaged: “Yes, the fact that
Kyoto would hurt the economic well being of seniors and the poor is of
particular concern.”64
The Luntz memorandum closed by listing several “principles” of
environmental policy and global warming.65 First, “sound science” must
govern decisions on which problems to tackle and how to approach them.
Second, it is necessary to identify “real risks” to human health and safety
before deciding how to address a problem. Both these principles reflect the
most fundamental element of the anti‐regulatory litany: “Prove it!” Third,
“[t]echnology, innovation and discovery” are the keys to providing a clean
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environment. In other words, the market will supply superior solutions to any
real environmental problems if only left to its own devices. Fourth,
environmental policies should take into account the economic impact on the
elderly, the poor, and those with fixed incomes. In other words, “It’s not fair!”
Fifth, “[t]he best solutions to environmental challenges are common sense
solutions,” implying that solutions dictated by the government rather than
chosen by the market will be irrational. This point reflects the litany’s claim
that regulation is too expensive both in absolute terms and in comparison to the
resulting environmental benefits. Sixth, “[a]ll nations must share responsibility
for the environment.” In other words, “It’s not fair (again)!” Finally, changes in
national policy should be “fully discussed in an open forum” with
opportunities for public input. In other words, the government can’t be trusted
and they must be hiding something from the rest of us.

VIII. The Political Response
The advice set forth in the Luntz memorandum found a receptive audience
among politicians opposed to government action to address climate change.
The impact of the Luntz memorandum is illustrated by their repeated reliance
on the theme that sound science supports neither the assertion that a serious
problem exists nor the conclusion that human activities are largely responsible
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for causing it if it does. Senator Inhofe, for example, suggested on more than
one occasion that global climate change might be “the greatest hoax ever
perpetrated on the American people,” making the advocates of government
action on climate change seem no different than those who claim they have
been abducted by aliens or seen the Loch Ness monster. Inhofe’s position
amounts to a particularly crude version of the “Prove it!” strategy.
The Bush Administration’s approach has been slightly more subtle. Vice
President Cheney predicted a “big debate” on the question of whether climate
change is due to natural climate cycles or human activity.66 In an effort to
support the claim that scientific uncertainty over the causes of climate change
makes regulation premature, the Administration sought to generate confusion
over the science surrounding climate change. Two political scientists at the
University of Illinois describe those steps:
The Bush Administration has developed statutory and regulatory
mechanisms designed to limit the flow of scientific information to
the public, and implemented a legal framework to legitimize these
mechanisms. The actions of the Bush Administration in restricting
the public’s access to government sponsored climate change
research is unprecedented, affecting the relationship between
science and policy in a way that changes the traditional
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independent role that scientists have played in the United States.
These actions of the Bush Administration also negatively affect the
media’s access to government scientists who are recognized experts
in the field.67

White House officials edited scientific documents on climate change
prepared by government scientists to reinforce the idea that the scientific
community has not yet provided sufficient evidence to produce consensus on
the link between greenhouse gas emissions and warming global temperatures.
According to a former Republican chief of staff for the House of
Representatives science committee, opponents of climate change regulation
“settled on the ‘science isn’t there’ argument because they didn’t believe they’d
be able to convince the public to do nothing if climate change were real.”68 The
head of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in mid‐2007
characterized the view that humans should take steps to affect the world’s
climate as “arrogant” and questioned whether climate change is serious
enough to warrant concern among policymakers.69 According to some reports,
the Smithsonian Institute watered down an exhibit on the impact of climate
change in the Arctic and avoided any reference to the cause of those changes
due to fear of adverse reactions from the Bush Administration and Congress.
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A. A Change in Corporate Culture?
As the evidence of the dangers of climate change become increasingly
irrefutable, all but the most shameless opponents of government action to
address it have curtailed their invocation of at least some elements of the litany.
Some corporations have conceded that the problem is real and announced their
support for doing something about it. In some cases, businesses such as Wal‐
Mart have taken steps to cut their own consumption of electricity and
encouraged consumers to purchase energy‐efficient products. Other firms, such
as Dow Chemical, have invested millions of dollars in research and
development of technologies and products intended to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. Such positions do not necessarily translate into support for
regulation, but some businesses have even supported the adoption of
mandatory emissions controls on greenhouse gases. The inducements for
supporting either voluntary corporate initiatives or more systematic regulatory
programs to address climate change may include taking a socially responsible
position or burnishing the corporation’s public image by placing a green sheen
on its activities.
Some businesses have realized that supporting climate change initiatives
is in their own self interest. Some insurance companies, for example, support
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regulation to mitigate climate change because unabated climate change will
cause them to incur significant liabilities to insureds injured by the
consequences of climate change, such as coastal flooding or extreme weather
events.70 Timber companies may benefit from climate change regulation if it
presents opportunities for them to sell credits generated by the preservation of
carbon sinks to industrial emitters of greenhouse gases who wish to avoid
making their own reductions.71 Segments of the energy industry that do not
rely on the production or consumption of fossil fuels clearly have much to gain
if restrictions are placed on greenhouse gas emissions. Some companies, such
as Dow Chemical, see opportunities to profit from the manufacture and sale of
energy‐saving products, such as insulation, lightweight plastics, and solar
technologies.72 Some companies support climate change regulation because
they believe they can comply more quickly or efficiently than their competitors,
providing them with at least a short‐term market advantage.73 Some support
regulation because they have already begun lowering their greenhouse gas
emissions and stand to profit by selling emission allowances if federal climate
change regulation includes an emissions trading regime.
Despite this movement toward support for dealing with climate change,
industry has not abandoned its reliance on the litany described in this chapter.
Some business support for climate change legislation is based on the fear that
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delaying its adoption is likely to produce more onerous regulation, either
because the evidence of the adverse consequences of climate change will
continue to accumulate or because of a change in the balance of political power
in Congress and the White House. Businesses that have reluctantly begun to
support climate change regulation for these reasons can be expected to invoke
some elements of the litany as they push politicians toward policy solutions
least likely to adversely affect their interests. Some will assuredly argue, for
example, that particular policy options are technologically unrealistic, too
expensive, or not worth the ensuing costs of compliance. They will also assert
that policy options under consideration unfairly require them to make
sacrifices not being demanded of other significant contributors to climate
change.
The willingness of portions of corporate America to accept the reality of
global climate change and take responsibility for avoiding or mitigating its
adverse effects is a welcome development. It creates unique opportunities for
the United States to become a world leader in developing both technological
and regulatory solutions to climate change problems. Government programs,
whether they are incentive‐based or of a more traditional regulatory character,
stand a greater chance of succeeding if the affected industries adopt a
cooperative rather than an antagonistic posture.
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The abandonment of some elements of the litany by a segment of the
business community, however, by no means indicates that the litany has run its
course or that the strategies laid out in the Luntz memorandum are no longer
relevant to the political discourse on climate change. Some industries −
segments of the fossil fuel production industry come quickly to mind − remain
entrenched in their virulent opposition to any government efforts to address
climate change. They almost certainly will continue to assert that important
scientific questions remain unsettled with respect to both the existence and
causes of climate change and that government efforts to mitigate the adverse
effects of climate change must wait resolution of these questions. Just as
assuredly, even if those arguments become even more untenable than they
already are, they will predict economic ruin in an effort to convince
environmental policy makers to adopt weak versions of climate change
regulation.

B. Government Clings to the Litany
The willingness of some portions of industry to accept the need for meaningful
action on climate change is a promising sign that the debate on how to deal
with climate change has the potential to move beyond the stale rhetoric of free
market liberalism. Tragically, the federal government thus far has not
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demonstrated a similar willingness to address the problem in constructive
terms. Too many officials responsible for dictating the timing and content of
federal climate change policy seem stuck in the mindset that the unimpeded
free market provides the only legitimate means for protecting Americans
against environmental, health, and safety risks. They continue to regard
government as the principal problem rather than as a vehicle for enhancing the
quality of life of the American people by helping to mitigate environmental
risks such as those posed by climate change. Some, such as Senator Inhofe,
even persist in denying that climate change is due to human activity and that
restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions can play a useful role in mitigating
climate change.
These policy makers have stuck to their story, no matter how much it
strains credulity and ignores the facts. The story is that climate change is not
occurring; that it is not caused by human activity even if it is real; that there is
no viable technological fix; that the adverse economic consequences of
engaging in efforts to address climate change will be monumental, and
certainly not worth the meager benefits (if any) likely to flow from climate
change regulation; and that efforts to restrict activities that contribute to global
warming and replace those activities with more environmentally friendly
alternatives will impose unfair burdens on innocent and helpless Americans
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and fundamentally alter the American lifestyle in ways that most Americans
will find unacceptable, if not abhorrent. Little progress can be made in enlisting
the assistance of industry in working with government to reduce the risks of
climate change and to endorse necessary progressive solutions as long as the
free market ideology that has generated these responses controls the debate.
Characterizing climate change as the “greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the
American people” is hardly the way to craft constructive environmental policy
that meets the needs of the American people and provides the kind of
leadership the United States once provided in dealing with all sorts of
worldwide social problems.
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